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Abstract
The Nigerian economy is now embroiled in a deep 
economic crises. This is partly due to the inability of 
successive Nigerian leaders to unlock the potential for 
capitalist development and intensive industrialization 
in Nigeria. An assessment of the structure of the 
Nigerian economy along with the indicators of capitalist 
development may be in order here. However, this study 
examines the development of capitalism in Nigeria, 
tracing the potential for capitalist development from 
the pre-colonial, colonial to the postcolonial periods 
of Nigeria’s history. The paper argues that while pre-
colonial Nigerian social formations developed ‘capitalistic’ 
and commercial sectors and were woven into different 
trade and commercial networks, it was colonialism that 
effectively sought to transform antecedent modes of 
production or co-opt pre-capitalist modes of production 
into the capitalist world system. However, given the 
limited aims of the colonial state in Nigeria, full scale 
transformation of the economy was not on the agenda and 
the postcolonial state has not pursued a vigorous plan for 
capitalist development and industrialization. This study 
argued that capitalist development in Nigeria can be most 
persuasively understood by examining the combination 
of local and international factors that have combined to 
confound the lineage of capitalist development in Nigeria.
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INTRODUCTION
The economic crises now plaguing the Nigerian 
political economy revolves undoubtedly around the 
inability of the Nigerian state to promote full blown 
capitalist development and industrialization in Nigeria. 
This problem is hardly novel and in fact dates back 
to the economic framework that was imposed by the 
British colonial state in Nigeria (Kohli, 2004). With the 
peripheralization of the Nigerian political economy, 
the circuit of capital and production was such that 
the Nigerian economy was largely drained for raw 
materials to service the industrial needs of metropolitan 
Britain. Indeed, to pose the question: Why has it in fact 
been virtually impossible to transform Nigeria from a 
raw material extraction zone into a hub of industrial 
production and manufacturing within the international 
economic system?
An assessment of the structure of the Nigerian 
economy along with the indicators of capitalist 
development may be in order here. However, in this study, 
we seek undertake a historical examination of the lineage 
of capitalist development in Nigeria. While capitalism 
was introduced into Nigeria through the medium of 
British colonialism, several factors have in fact shaped 
the ongoing attempt to transform Nigeria into a full-
fledged capitalist economy and any attempt to take stock 
of capitalist development in Nigeria must account for the 
combination of internal and external factors that have 
continued to confound the development of capitalism in 
Nigeria. Interestingly, there is no shortfall of interest on 
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the subject. The history and developmental trajectory of 
capitalist development in Nigeria has been analysed from 
different intellectual and theoretical vantage points (Osoba, 
1978; Beckman, 1982; Ihonvbere & Ekekwe, 1988; 
Collins, 1983; Lewis, 1994; Ovadia, 2013). 
By capitalism we refer to the contradictory relationship 
of exploitation that exists between the capitalists and wage 
labourer as well as the market mediated form of surplus 
extraction (Rosenberg, 1994). From this perspective, the 
penetration of capitalist social relations into the Nigerian 
social formation in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries therefore marked an encounter with capitalist 
modernity. The key question that we wish to answer is 
why colonialism failed to create progressive conditions 
for capitalism to thrive by removing the limitations to 
capitalist property relations? Indeed as Guha posed the 
question with reference to India:
Why did the universalist drive of the world’s most advanced 
capitalist culture, a phenomenon that corresponded to the 
most dynamic capital of the time, fail in the Indian instance 
to match the strength and fullness of its political dominion by 
assimilating, if not abolishing, the pre-capitalist culture of the 
subject people. (Guha, 1997, p.63) 
This problem stems in part from the colonial strategy 
which was largely anchored on depriving colonial subjects 
the liberties and freedoms that had been extended to 
citizens in the metropoles and the bifurcation of political 
subjectivity in the colony between citizens under civil 
law and subjects under customary law (Grovogui, 2003; 
Mamdani, 1996). This issues therefore broadly indicate 
the racialized international context within which colonial 
capitalism unfolded. Marx and Engels elided this 
issue in their original position on capitalism’s inherent 
expansionist tendency, a position Marx later revised but 
did not rework into a coherent theoretical statement about 
the trajectory of capitalism in a world historical context 
(Teschke, 2008). In this regard, Marx and Engels arguably 
exaggerated the transformation powers of the capitalist 
mode of production and largely elided the modes of 
resistance posed by pre-capitalist modes of production to 
their wholesale subsumption within the orbit of capital. 
Similarly from a neoclassical economic perspective, 
developmentalists stress the transformation power of 
capitalism arguing that it would lead to the movement 
of “individual productive units” from “meagre self-
sufficiency to prosperous independence of producers…
integrated into a network of markets, information flows 
and social institutions” (Johnson & Kilby, 1975, cited in 
Cooper, 1981). This outcome would be activated by the 
autonomy of the market free from the disruptive impact 
of state intervention. The prerequisite for capitalist 
development, as prescribed by neoclassical economists, 
was hardly guaranteed by the colonial Nigerian state 
(Gavin, 1985). Indeed as Brett (1973) and Wolff (1974) 
have noted, the colonial state stifled African autonomy 
and redefined economic structures in the interest of the 
extraction of surplus by the metropolis (cited in Cooper, 
1981).
In colonial contexts, where state-led development 
was expected to prop up production and industrialization 
as a catch up strategy, the imperatives of imperialism 
and the need to avoid the production of locally produced 
competitive commodities ensured that this was not on 
the agenda. Marx and Engels had originally assumed that 
whatever the atrocities the colonial powers committed 
on the way, they would ultimately develop the countries 
over which they ruled to the point where they would 
produce their own gravediggers as they had in the existing 
capitalist countries (Anderson, 2010). In this respect 
they erred since the colonial powers had no intention of 
hastening their own demise by developing the economies 
of the subject peoples at least not in any systematic way 
(Davidson, 2009). Gowan described this phenomenon with 
regards to British occupied Iraq as involving “the creation 
of new foundational institutions of landownership in order 
to revive dying traditional authority relations, resulting 
in economically and socially regressive consequences 
undertaken for thoroughly modern imperialist political 
purposes….” (1999, cited in Davidson, 2009). This 
strategy bears striking similarity with British imperial 
strategy in other contexts, notably in India as well as in 
Nigeria. In the Nigerian case, British colonialism fostered 
the co-constitution of seemingly opposed social orders as 
indigenous chiefs were used to govern colonial subjects 
through customary law but also because economically the 
British sought the quickest way to exploit resources from 
Nigeria through a combination of free and coerced labour. 
These issues were arguably beyond the frame of Marx and 
Engels. 
This study therefore argues that the development of 
capitalism across the world did not create uniformity but 
instead reinforced the production of developmentally 
differentiated societies. With particular reference to 
Trotsky’s notion of uneven and combined development, 
this paper will attempt to explain the lineage of capitalist 
development in Nigeria particularly against the backdrop 
of the contradictions that defines the experiences of the 
Nigerian state and society. It argues that the trajectory of 
capitalist development in Nigeria has been fundamentally 
shaped by the (i) character of the pre-colonial and pre-
capitalist social formations (ii) the form of colonial rule 
and capitalist penetration and (iii) the relationship between 
the state and the economy beginning from the colonial 
era to the post-colonial period. To achieve this, we 
examine the idea of uneven and combined development as 
articulated by Trotsky (1980), and its recent elaboration by 
International Relations scholars led by Rosenberg (2006, 
2010, and 2013) and we interrogate its implications for 
explaining capitalism in colonized settings. We argue that 
the character of colonial capitalism is particularly defined 
by the international and imperial context. Secondly, we 
identify the varying pre-capitalist social formations that 
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existed in Nigeria particularly before colonialism and their 
implication for the development of capitalism. Thirdly, 
we consider the development of capitalism under colonial 
rule. Afterwards, the study examines the particular ways 
in which capitalist social relations are being entrenched in 
post-colonial Nigeria and the obstacles to the development 
capitalism. This study argues that capitalist development 
in Nigeria can be most persuasively understood by 
“integrating the vertical and horizontal, temporal and 
spatial determinations that is central to Trotsky’s theory of 
uneven and combined development” (Matin, 2012).
1 .  U N E V E N  A N D  C O M B I N E D 
DEVELOPMENT: BEYOND UNEVEN 
DEVELOPMENT
Marx characterized the development of capitalism 
as fundamentally marked by uneven growth rates. 
Since surplus is not accumulated at the same level 
between capitalist firms, the differential level of capital 
accumulation tends to bring about uneven development at 
national level as firms out-compete themselves, but also 
at regional and international levels, such that capital is 
accumulated differentially among countries. This view is 
in contrast to the assumption by neoclassical economists 
who argue that trade and competition would bring about 
convergence among firms, regions and countries and that 
capitalism has an equilibration potential (Weeks, 1999; 
McIntyre, 1992). However, the position of neoclassical 
economists has hardly correlated with the empirical 
records. As some reports have demonstrated, there is 
no evidence of a levelling convergence of growth rates, 
and therefore, levels of per capita income (Weeks, 
1999). Marx’s analysis of capitalism is therefore more 
compelling since it stresses the tendency for capitalism to 
simultaneously integrate and fragment the world. 
The rub of the idea of uneven development therefore is 
that as capital has come to have transnational expressions, 
the distinctive national context in which capitalist social 
formations are engrafted upon has therefore spawned 
differences in the spread of world capitalism. “The 
spread of capitalism”, Cooper (1981) observed, “spawned 
wage labor factories in Massachusetts, haciendas in 
Brazil, mines using migrant labor with subsistence in 
South Africa, and peasants in Uganda….” This idea was 
although not elaborated upon by Marx, its implications 
figure in his analysis of capitalism (Wainwright, 2008; 
McIntyre, 1992), but it was in the writings of Leon 
Trotsky, that the idea has been elaborated. In Trotsky’s 
writings, uneven development has three aspects. Firstly, it 
meant the process by which advanced states had reached 
their leading positions within the structured inequality 
of the world system. Secondly, it meant the on-going 
rivalry between great powers which involved them trying 
to “catch up and overtake” each other in a contest for 
supremacy which would continue as long as capitalism 
itself. And thirdly, the activities of imperialist states which 
involved them collectively but competitively asserting 
their dominance over both colonial states and states which 
although were independent but were dependent countries 
(Davidson, 2009).
However for Trotsky, the significance of uneven 
development fed into the lateral chain of world historical 
development. He therefore regarded uneven development 
as the most “general law of the historic process” (1980, 
cited in Rosenberg, 2006, p.313). Uneven development 
implied that “at any given historical point, the human 
world has comprised a variety of societies, of differing 
sizes, cultural forms and levels of material development” 
(Rosenberg, 2006, p.313). For Trotsky, the starting 
point for analysing unevenness is the natural and 
ecologically given conditions that imposed the “limit of 
the possible” and this factor was implicated in the relative 
backwardness of Russia in relation to the west. Its less 
than favourable geographical situation was the initial 
cause for the “comparative primitiveness and slowness 
of its social developments which retarded processes of 
class formation and their relations with the state” (Trotsky, 
1962, 1957, cited in Allinson & Anievas, 2009).  
Under capitalism the character of unevenness is 
fundamentally transformed as capitalism gains mastery 
over inherited unevenness, “breaking and altering it, 
employing therein its own means and method” (Trotsky, 
1936, p.19 cited in Allinson & Anievas, 2009, p.50). But 
beyond the uneven nature of development, Trotsky was 
interested in explaining its significance for the trajectory 
of world historical development. The principal way this 
is mediated is through the geopolitical whip of external 
necessity as the geopolitical challenge posed by more 
advanced capitalist societies imposes the need for other 
societies to undertake reforms as a catch up strategy. The 
implication is that they embark on a process of borrowing 
and adaptation. However, the example of pioneer 
developers shapes the development of backward societies 
as an advantage of backwardness, since they can borrow 
and adapt ideas and technologies from more advanced 
societies without simulating the lineage of development 
of pioneer developers. Consequently their development 
would be compressed as they achieve in a very short 
time, advances that took place in pioneer developers over 
a generation. As this ramifies within the social structure 
of societies, it enables combustible circumstances and 
pits asynchronous and seemingly incommensurable 
developmental scenarios within a contemporaneous 
time and space, therefore it gives rise to peculiar and 
differentiated combined social formations, “the drawing 
together of different stages of the journey, combining 
of separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more 
contemporary forms” (Trotsky, 1980, cited in Davidson, 
2009).
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The debate amongst adherents of this idea is whether 
this perspective can be extended beyond the era of 
capitalism. Three perspectives have therefore emerged in 
this regard: The first, argues that uneven and combined 
development figures as a trans-historical covering 
generalization about the nature of social development in 
general (Rosenberg, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2013; Matin 
2007, 2013). A second view conceded that uneven and 
combined development is a general law of the historical 
process but seeks to specify its dynamic operation and 
manifestation in the pre-capitalist and capitalist eras. 
This perspective holds that it is only under capitalism 
that uneven and combined development has been fully 
activated (Allinson & Anievas, 2009). While the third 
view limits the significance of the concept to the capitalist 
epoch (Davidson, 2009; Ashman, 2009).
Our take on this debate is that uneven and combined 
development can be extended beyond the capitalist era 
particularly in Africa where long distance trade routes 
have facilitated the transmission of culture and religions 
that exerted enormous impact on the nature of pre-
colonial social formations (cf. Makki, 2011). The spread 
of Islam into West Africa through the trans-Saharan 
trade routes integrated elites in West Africa and the Arab 
world into a common network that was hinged on the 
Islamic religion (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The emergence 
of trading networks and merchant Diasporas in West 
Africa are clear indications of the workings of the logic 
of uneven and combined development in pre-colonial 
and pre-capitalist settings in Africa. Further justification 
of the import of uneven and combined development for 
understanding pre-colonial societies in Africa is clearly 
beyond the purview of this article but those who argue 
otherwise are clearly arguing contrary to the rich welter 
of African history.
2 .  U N E V E N  A N D  C O M B I N E D 
DEVELOPMENT, CAPITALISM AND PRE-
COLONIAL SOCIAL FORMATIONS IN 
NIGERIA
The Nigerian society was created out of a multiplicity 
of pre-colonial socio-political formations. According 
to archaeological findings, people began to occupy the 
Nigerian territory from around 10,000 to 2000 BCE. This 
was as a result of migratory trend southwards which was 
triggered by the desiccation in the Sahara. Archaeological 
evidence record the use of stone tools and the emergence 
of permanent settlements as a result of agriculture (Falola 
& Heaton, 2008). But this social formations differed in 
(i) the degree of centralization of power ranging from 
states with centralized political authority to societies with 
decentralized political structure evincing complexity in 
forms that challenged commonplace assumptions (ii) the 
mode of production and class structure. The key point 
therefore is to specify the character of the social classes 
that existed in particular social formations, the mode of 
surplus extraction, the relationship between the state and 
the ruling class and forms of articulation/combination of 
modes of production that existed in these pre-colonial 
social formations. 
Social formations in pre-colonial Africa are developed 
at the intersection of a combination of social and 
geopolitical processes. Not least because, both domestic 
production and long distance trade (Makki, 2011) 
provided the basis for surplus accumulation in these social 
formations during this period, although the reliance on 
long distance trade would depend on the extent to which 
surplus was accumulated domestically (Amin, 1977). 
Given the inability of ruling classes in these societies 
to accumulate surplus domestically, long distance trade 
had enormous significance as ruling classes sought to 
control trade as a means of consolidating ruling class 
positions. Invariably the significance of long distance 
trade as a means of social and political reproduction 
had divergent implications for state formation in these 
societies. Similarly, Coquery-vidrovitch (1977) has argued 
that the economic life of pre-colonial African societies 
was characterised by the juxtaposition of two apparently 
contradictory levels: the local subsistence village and 
international and transcontinental commerce. The key 
issue is why social formations in pre-colonial Nigeria 
were unable to generate surplus beyond the level of 
subsistence? 
Elsewhere in Africa, the extraction of surplus from 
peasant and tribute paying populations was partly 
responsible for the lack of dynamism of the tributary mode 
of production as peasant population were dis-incentivised 
from revolutionizing production since surplus would 
be extracted from them through extra-economic means 
(Makki, 2011). However, in many societies in sub-Saharan 
Africa, the low level of domestic production meant that 
there was no surplus to products in the first place. This 
factor has been attributed to a combination of factors such 
as population density, the rough environmental terrain and 
the low level of technology (Goody, 1977). Along similar 
lines, Coquery-vidrovitch (1977) concluded that black 
Africa is the least place in which agriculture is likely to 
produce a surplus. These limitations therefore made it 
necessary for ruling classes to turn to long distance trade 
as necessity for consolidating elite positions. 
In pre-colonial Nigeria, there were numerous political 
formations and they ranged from the most centralized 
political systems in Northern Nigeria to decentralized 
political systems in South Eastern Nigeria amongst 
the Igbo people. For our purpose, we would focus on 
the Hausa and Hausa/Fulani pre-colonial system. The 
Hausa States and Hausa/Fulani system Emirate system in 
Northern Nigeria were integrated into trade and regional 
links that were hinged on the trans-Saharan trade routes 
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from North Africa that served not only as a means for 
facilitating commerce but as an artery for cultural and 
religious exchanges (Falola & Heaton, 2008). Prior to the 
Fulani jihad in 1804, Hausa states such as Kano, Kaduna, 
Zaria and Gobir were the dominant states in the northern 
savanna and they developed centralized political systems 
and commercial sectors. Trade with neighbouring Hausa 
states and across the Sahara desert was an integral part 
of economic life. In Kano for instance, an emerging 
capitalising sector was on the rise. According to Illife 
(1983), Kano was the predominant textile centre in West 
Africa. 
Hausa states developed tributary modes of production 
that were characterised by exploitative relationship 
between Hausa states and free peasants. Control over 
trade routes was an important source of revenue for 
Hausa states and struggles over the control of trade 
routes was the source of internecine warfare in the 
region (Falola & Heaton, 2008). The movement of goods 
to Hausa land and to other states within its regional 
domains therefore imposed pressures on the domestic 
economy that manifested in the progressive development 
of the crafts sector in the Hausa economy. However, the 
change in the social structure in Hausa land following the 
Fulani jihad of 1804 and the centralizing imperative that 
resulted re-configured the character of the relationship 
between the state and the dominant class forces but the 
new system that emerged however remained tributary 
and this was evident in the three forms of surplus 
that was extracted by peasant household: labour rent 
which took the form of direct labour activity whether 
on community projects or through military service; 
rent in kind which took the form of payment of zakat 
and money rent (Shenton & Freund, 1978). The class 
structure in Hausa land was however complexified by the 
usage of slaves within the economy. There is however no 
consensus on the implication of this for the Hausa class 
structure and mode of production but the use of slaves 
had the peculiar advantage of helping to strengthen 
ruling class positions (Ibid.). 
However in spite of a growing capitalistic sector that 
was based on craft production and the circulation of 
merchant capital from Hausa land to North Africa, Hausa 
states failed to develop an indigenous capitalism (Illife, 
1983). Craft production in cloth and iron tools emanating 
from household production helped to create a distinctive 
sphere of commodity production that was facilitated by 
the use of cowry as currency (Shenton & Freund, 1978). 
But the logic of pre-capitalist trade dictated who the 
dominant forces would turn out to be. In fact, as have been 
demonstrated, a significant portion of the social surplus 
in Hausa land was appropriated by merchants’ activity in 
the long distance kola trade but also by merchants dealing 
in food and cloths (Ibid.). Similarly, in a study by Philip 
Shea of the nineteenth century dyeing industry he found 
out that most of the surplus did not go to the owners of 
dye pits or to dyers but to merchants who controlled the 
supply of cloth. But given the nature of pre-capitalist 
trade, such outcome would be not be unexpected. Indeed 
as Marx has suggested, “In the precapitalist stages of 
society commerce ruled industry. In modern society, 
the reverse is true” (cited in Rosenberg, 1994, p.101). 
In Hausa land therefore, the peculiar trajectory of the 
development of commerce was particularly governed 
by the structural features of pre-capitalist trade and this 
ensured that the key determinant of prices was not the 
factors of production but the factors affecting circulation 
(Rosenberg, 1994). This therefore explains why the 
balance in the social relations in Hausa land was skewed 
in favour of the merchants rather than the owners of the 
means of productions.  
3 .  C O L O N I A L I S M  A N D  T H E 
DEVELOPMENT OF CAPITALISM IN 
NIGERIA
The slave trade was steadily replaced by legitimate 
commerce following the abolition of the trade. But 
this was a slow process, as slave merchants and ruling 
classes that had become heavily reliant on the trade were 
unwilling to give up the advantage that they came to enjoy 
through the trade. Yet it is argued that with abolition of 
the slave trade, the use of slaves was a straightforward 
economic choice in a situation in which markets offered 
incentives to expand production and where other sources 
of labour were expensive (Hopkins, 1973, cited in 
Cooper, 1978). But the former situation may have been 
the case in Lagos where the unwillingness of the Oba 
Kosoko of Lagos to end the slave trade was said to have 
been responsible for his deposition as the Oba and the 
installation of Akintoye as the Oba of Lagos. In return, 
Oba Akintoye signed a treaty committing him to the 
abolition of the slave trade. In this regard, the claims 
made for the absorptive capacity of the agricultural 
market was therefore exaggerated particularly as it 
ignored the specificity of pre-colonial social structures. In 
1861, Lagos was annexed as a crown colony of the British 
empire and cumulatively through wars of conquests and 
by signing treaties of protection the Nigerian state was 
created incrementally through a process of incremental 
acquisition of territories that eventually culminated in the 
creation of the Nigerian state through the amalgamation 
of the Colony of Lagos and Protectorate of Southern 
Nigeria and the Protectorate of Northern Nigeria in 1914. 
The key question here is whether colonialism fostered 
the development of capitalism and if it did, how did it 
happen? In other words, why did British colonialism not 
create the conditions for capitalism to thrive through the 
deliberate destruction of all the obstacles to capitalist 
development?
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The answer is that considering the aim of British 
colonialism, it could not pursue that path and its 
unwillingness to do so, has created the condition for the 
peculiar development of capitalism in Nigeria. Trotsky’s 
reflection on uneven and combined development 
could provide insight here. Arguing with reference to 
Russia, he noted that the development of capitalism 
and its industrialization process took place in a social 
milieu that tied the emergent bourgeois class to strong 
relationship with the old Tsarist regime. Indeed, because 
the Tsarist regime was playing a role in the industrial 
development of Russia, partly out of geopolitical 
necessity, it was creating the very conditions that was 
reinforcing capitalism in Russia. The social structure 
of Tsarist regime which emerged from the feudal 
aristocratic social class was the very class that had been 
undermined by the bourgeois capitalist class in England. 
This meant that the revolutionary task in Russia cannot 
be a bourgeois revolution given that the bourgeoisie had 
itself become tied with all sorts of links with the Tsarist 
regime and with foreign imperialist. The revolutionary 
task would have to be a permanent revolution that 
would fuse the bourgeois and proletariat revolutionary 
aims into a permanent uninterrupted process and would 
reverberate internationally because Russia cannot be 
saved amidst capitalist countries (Trotsky, 1978). This 
point has particular significance for the shape of colonial 
capitalism. Under colonial rule, the ambition of the 
colonial regime and the role of the foreign capitalist in 
draining raw materials away from the periphery meant 
that colonized territories would have to encounter 
capitalism differently. 
The colonial economy was managed in ways that 
privileged the aims of the metropolitan economy, 
essentially a drainage economic model that was 
characterised by the expropriation of raw materials to 
service the domestic demands of the British economy but 
also by the non-commitment of the colonial government to 
develop the productive and industrial base of the colonial 
Nigerian economy. In this regard, the structural dichotomy 
between the peripheral economy and metropolitan 
economy was such that
the circuit of generalized commodity production in peripheral 
capitalist societies is not internally complete as in the case of 
metropolitan capitalism. For them, that circuit is completed only 
by virtue of their link with metropolitan economy by producing 
for exports and as markets for colonial imports. (Alavi, 1981, 
p.480) 
Relatedly, the role of the colonial state in relation to 
the economy was to provide access roads, railways and 
harbour through which extracted raw materials could 
be shipped to Britain for use, as well as abolish trading 
monopolies of coastal principalities, internal tolls, and 
the arbitrary interference of African rulers with the free 
conduct of commerce (Williams, 1980). Colonialism 
transformed the class relations and political institutions 
of the Nigerian society. Although pre-colonial institutions 
governing kinship, land tenure and nobility survived 
and even flourished, they were adapted to meet new 
requirements within a different structure of relations 
to market and state. Moreover, colonial land law made 
it almost impossible for foreigners to own land and to 
initiate large scale plantation agriculture and government 
did not undertake measures aimed at promoting new 
agrarian technology (Kohli, 2004). A key commentary 
of the development of capitalism is the way in which 
capitalism failed to transform or absorb peasants into 
commercial agriculture or to promote sudden intensive 
industrialization. This failure is due to a combination 
of domestic and external cum structural factors. 
Domestically, the absorption of the peasantry into the 
world agricultural market was met by mixed reactions. 
Indeed with the introduction of the marketing boards 
from the 1930s in Nigeria, Nigerian politicians began to 
use profits from the board to further their own personal 
ambitions rather than provide infrastructure to enhance 
and promote commercial farming. The evasive practices 
of the farmers were a logical response against a system 
that had been unfairly rigged against them (Williams, 
1985).
Meanwhile the structure of the colonial state was 
itself an obstacle to the development of capitalism. The 
emergent state deployed an indirect rule system that 
retained the traditional and indigenous political structures 
but merely engrafted modern political apparatus at the 
apex of the system. The patrimonial structure of the 
colonial state favoured a neo-traditional political structure 
that sought to administer natives with due regard to 
their customs based on their customary laws thus ruling 
them as colonial subjects while restricting citizenship to 
urban centres largely occupied by colonial administrative 
elites (Mamdani, 1996). In the light of this, what is the 
implication of uneven and combined development for 
capitalist development in Nigeria?
Undoubtedly with the penetration of foreign capital 
into Nigeria, the Nigerian political economy was drawn 
fully into the orbit of world capitalism, yet as an emergent 
combination, the social relations of production and the 
productive forces were altered in ways that defined the 
developmental lineage of capitalism in Nigeria. Indeed, 
while the Nigerian economy had become functionally 
capitalist, the colonial state failed to absorb a huge 
proportion of the population into the capitalist economy 
owing to a combination of local factors and the colonial 
framework itself. Indeed the limited aims of British 
colonialism ensured that capitalism assumed the form of 
a mercantile enterprise solely interested in expropriating 
resources from Nigeria without the reconstituted impulses 
that are typical of the capitalist economy. This is the most 
confounding element of the emergent combination—
without agrarian capitalism (Williams, 1988) and rapid 
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intensive industrialization, the structural features of pre-
capitalism governed capitalism under colonialism in 
Nigeria.
4. CAPITALISM IN POST-COLONIAL 
NIGERIA
From the above, it is clear that capitalism is developing 
in Nigeria in ways that pose challenges to classical social 
theories of capitalist modernity. In this regard, Trotsky’s 
observation that English capitalism may have predicted 
capitalism in France but less so of Germany, Russia and 
India is therefore apt. In this section, I would attempt to 
examine the varying explanations that have been offered 
for the character of capitalism vis-à-vis the state in Nigeria.
The starting point here is Marx’s original formulation 
that class formation revolves around the relations to the 
means of production. However since its formation, the 
formation of classes in Nigeria does not arise from the 
control over the means of production but rather arises 
from control over state power (Sklar, 1979; Diamond, 
1987). As Sklar observed, “the presumed economic 
basis of class determination is a major obstacle to the 
comprehension of class structures that may appear to have 
been reared, largely, upon non-economic foundations” 
(1979, p.532). In these instances given the absence of a 
national bourgeois class and the often disruptive impact 
of imperialism on pre-capitalist modes of production 
and surplus accumulation, the colonial state invariably 
becomes the source of capital for an incipient capitalist 
class. As Sklar noted with specific reference to Nigeria, 
it was political parties before and immediately after 
independence in 1960 that served as conspicuous agents 
of class formation by creating ‘‘elaborate systems of 
administrative and commercial patronage, involving the 
‘liberal use of public funds to promote indigenous private 
enterprise, while many of their leading members entered 
upon a comparable manner of life in parliamentary 
office’’’ (1979, p.534). 
While this point is taken, the key argument that 
remains unresolved is whether these are autonomous 
processes taking place free from the influence of foreign 
capital. Sklar for one wants to counter claims made 
by dependency theorists that foreign governments and 
businessmen often determine the rate and scope of local 
capital investment. In fact, he posited that “the idea of 
foreign domination by proxy, through the medium of a 
clientele or puppetised upper class, is controverted by 
a large body of evidence” (1979, p.531). It may well be 
therefore, that the forms of structural blockage forged by 
imperial powers and the need to maintain a raw material 
extraction zone to service the raw material needs of 
the capitalist world system are not factored into this 
argument. Yet this was just part of the narrative. Indeed, 
considering the nationalist fervour that framed economic 
policies in the early years of the independence period 
and the nationalization of foreign businesses that marked 
this period, it is only fair that on balance the willingness 
of African elites to act autonomously free from the 
determination of foreign capital is accounted for.
If Sklar discountenances the structural determination 
of Nigeria’s place in the world, other scholars appear to 
give too much primacy to structural factors. Writing from 
a dependency perspective, Osoba (1978) concluded that 
the Nigerian bourgeoisie and by extension the Nigerian 
economy are dependent on the international capitalist 
bourgeoisie and global imperialist economic order.
With regard therefore to the forces slowing down 
the development of capitalism, there are a range of 
explanations that have been provided. One explanation 
fingers the state involvement in the primary commodity 
market through marketing boards as responsible for the 
slow pace of development of capitalist agriculture in 
Nigeria (Gavin, 1985). The workings of the marketing 
boards were said to be merely draining surpluses 
from the peasantry away from the rural areas without 
ploughing this resource to aid peasant production in 
rural communities. This problem therefore necessitated 
all sorts of peasant responses that ranged from a return 
to subsistent production to other evasive strategies by 
the peasants to avoid being captured by the commodity 
market in the colonial and post-colonial epochs. The 
activities of the state were therefore believed to be an 
impediment to capitalist development particularly the 
development of capitalist agriculture. 
The absence of a developmental state that combines 
an ideology of development with the capacity to 
achieve its developmental aspiration has been said 
to be partly responsible for the inability of the post-
colonial state to provide the basis and conditions for 
capitalist development. Moreover the challenge with 
regards to Nigeria has been that of subordinating the 
peasantry to the imperatives of capitalist agriculture. 
Even when rich families have invested in agriculture 
and were able to secure various forms of unfree labour, 
it was difficult to enforce discipline over such unfree 
labour (Williams, 1988). The failure of capitalist farms 
was therefore a product of a combination of factors 
even when the incentives were created. In varying 
ways, the peasantry resisted being brought within the 
orbit of capitalist production and continued producing 
agricultural commodities on household basis with the 
household providing labour for peasant agriculture. On 
the whole, as Williams has argued peasant production in 
Nigeria remained persistent even in spite of attempts to 
absorb them within the capitalist system, but they limited 
production to the level of subsistence. In fact as he argued, 
what is absent in Nigeria is “a powerful and effective state 
with the capacity to coerce and to direct the allocation of 
labour power, to subsidize production costs and guarantee 
prices and market for produce” (Williams, 1988, p.385). 
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The particular constraining way in which capitalist 
development is unfolding has led to talks of dependent 
capitalism. Here it is argued that while the Nigerian 
social formation has been absorbed into the province of 
the world capitalist system, “postcolonial re-alignment 
of class forces and changing class positions and relations 
have not altered Nigeria’s position as an underdeveloped, 
poverty-stricken, technologically backward, unstable, 
foreign dominated and dependent country in the periphery 
of world capitalism” (Ihonvbere, 1988). Indeed while 
writers within the dependency tradition are wont to 
blame the fate of dependent societies on the structure of 
the world capitalist system, they tend to absolve their 
national elites of any serious blame for the challenges 
of development that has befallen their societies. In 
late-developing societies, the exigencies of economic 
development would mean that states would undertake 
catch up strategies largely fuelled by a nationalistic drive. 
Mkandawire (2001) argues that such nationalistic fervour 
were common in Africa in the first and second decades 
following independence, and that the failure of the 
developmental state to consummate their developmental 
aspirations was due to a combination of factors some of 
which he attributes to miscalculation, bad luck and to 
other factors beyond their control. He therefore provides 
a revisionist perspective to the effect that developmental 
states existed in Africa in the wake of calls for 
developmental states in Africa following the phenomenal 
achievements of state led development in Asia. This 
argument may indeed be persuasive when some states in 
Africa are considered. But the Nigerian state does not hold 
up well upon scrutiny of its efforts to drive development. 
In fact, Turner (1976) has noted a triangular relationship 
that emerged in the 1960s and 1970s around the oil sector 
in Nigeria with foreign firms, local middlemen and state 
officials constituting the triangle. Foreign firms looking 
for investment opportunities in Nigeria assign certain 
Nigerian middle men to help them access state officials 
who are willing to grant them contracts upon collection 
of kickbacks. Turner argues that such practices were 
not promoting the development of the market since the 
state dictated who joined the market and who did not. 
Involvement in the market is therefore not a product of 
the availability of a commodity which would interest the 
Nigerian consumers but a product of access to the market 
provided by state officials. 
On balance therefore any analysis of capitalist 
development in Nigeria must conjoin external factors 
such as the structure of the capitalist world system and 
the systematic blockage that has been forged against 
countries like Nigeria with internalised factors such as the 
failure of Nigerian elites to unblock their states through 
policies that are aimed at fostering the development of 
capitalist enterprises. How therefore can internalise and 
externality factors be accommodated within the premise 
of a unified social theory? The challenge of capitalist 
development has demonstrated that such a theory is 
ever more pressing. Indeed, we find that if we draw 
insights from Trotsky’s notion of uneven and combined 
development, it is the failure of the colonial and 
postcolonial states to pursue state driven development 
that accounts for the peculiar trajectory of capitalism 
in Nigeria, indeed, without a vibrant bourgeois class, it 
was obvious that the state had to step in to fill that void. 
Where the Tsarist state had been a crucial force in the 
Russian case buoyed by geopolitical imperatives, the 
absence of such geopolitical imperatives in the Nigerian 
case has been partly accounted for the laxity with which 
capitalist development was pursued. But in another sense, 
the neo-colonial character of the state derives any notion 
of autonomous capitalist development. Indeed, given 
these circumstances, it would appear that the primary 
task of the state was first to become “decolonized” 
before it can undertake the task of promoting capitalist 
development.
CONCLUSION
The recent economic crisis in the country has further 
underlined the fragile economic base of the Nigerian 
economy. Indeed, given the over-reliance on crude oil, 
fluctuation in the price of crude oil in the international 
market has had an unsettling effect on the ability of 
the Nigerian government to finance its budget. In the 
year 2016, the Nigerian government plans to borrow 
a whopping sum of $9.1 billion/N1.8 trillion from 
international and domestic sources to plug deficits in the 
2016 budget (Udoma, 2016). This would further increase 
the country’s debt profile which is already pegged at 
$68 billion and weaken the country’s economic position 
(Vanguard, 2016). For the constituent units of the Nigerian 
state, the over-reliance on federal allocations at a time of 
falling oil revenues has led to their inability to finance 
capital and recurrent expenditures within the states with 
only few exceptions. The Nigerian President confirmed 
this in March 2016 to the effect that 27 out of the 36 
Nigerian states are broke and unable to pay salaries (Sun 
Newspaper, 2016) Yet at the heart of this problem is the 
peculiar trajectory of capitalist development in Nigeria 
which has been largely driven by the oil sector, yet even 
in this regard, the country’s capacity to produce refined 
oil is abysmally low with the refineries producing at sub-
optimal levels.
To return to the question we posed in the introductory 
section again, why in spite of the domestic and 
international pressures to transform the economy into 
a full blown capitalist economy has the Nigerian state 
failed to radically transform the economy? In this paper, 
we have argued that the lineage of capitalism in Nigeria 
has been particularly confounded by the combination of 
local conditions and international cum structural factors 
that have combined to limit the wholesale transformation 
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of the Nigerian economy to a point where it begins to 
experience rapid intensive industrialization. In this regard, 
it would mean that any chance for a thoroughgoing 
capitalist development in Nigeria would first consist in the 
identification of the local and structural challenges that 
must be transcended in order to advance the development 
of capitalism. Trotsky’s uneven and combined development 
has the potential to unify internal and external factors 
within a single social theory. In this paper, we have 
attempted to indicate how this idea can help to explain 
the challenge of transforming Nigeria into a full scale 
capitalist economy. But as we have noted, given the 
uneven capitalist world system within which the Nigerian 
state has been incorporated, the development of capitalism 
in Nigeria could not have proceeded on the same lines 
with pioneer capitalist societies. Societal unevenness has 
therefore shaped the potential for capitalist development 
in Nigeria and the resultant combination that is evident 
in the confounding expression of capitalism in Nigeria, a 
country fully absorbed into the capitalist world economy 
but still unable to realize the dynamic reconstituted 
pressures that should be typical of capitalism itself. 
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